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THE PROBLEM OF THE INTIMIDATED WITNESS: THE NEED TO SHORE Up THE 
NANCE DOCTRINE REGARDING THE ADMISSION OF PRIOR STATEMENTS 
by Lynn McLain, Esq. 
a. The Problem 
On March 15,2000, three defendants were acquitted 
at the close of their trial for the murder of Shawn Suggs. I 
The defendants "slapped hands in exultation."2 
There had been serious problems with the State's 
case. Among these was that the State's key witness 
recanted her prior statement inculpating the defendants. 
The victim's mother was quoted in the newspaper as saying 
that the witness was scared of being murdered, and the 
mother didn't blame her.3 After all, another State's witness 
had been murdered.4 A third, who had been "kept in 
protective custody for three years while the case waited 
for trial, [had] disappeared."s 
When the preliminary draft of Title 5 of the Maryland 
Ru1es was being prepared by the Evidence Subcommittee 
of the Court of Appeals' Standing Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, Judge John Prevas of the Circuit 
Court of Baltimore City testified that the problem of 
recanting witnesses is a formidable obstacle to the pursuit 
of justice. He stated that the witnesses cooperate 
immediately after they see a serious crime, but by the time 
of trial, they all too often have been threatened by the 
accused's family or friends or the witnesses have been 
persuaded, in some way, that they wou1d be safer if they 
did not "get involved. ''6 
ICaitlin Francke, Three Freed Again in '95 Slaying, THE BALTIMORE SUN, 
Mar. 16, 2000, at A I. 
21d. 
3Tim Craig, Murder Trial Key Witness Withdraws I.D. o[Suspects, THE 
BALTIMORE SUN, MAR. 9, 2000, AT B18. 
4Francke, supra note I, at 6A, col. 3. 
'Id. 
6Notes from a Special Reporter for the Evidence Subcommittee and the 
Under traditional common law rules, followed in 
Maryland until 1993, a witness's prior inconsistent 
statements were admissible for impeachment purposes 
only and not as substantive evidence (unless of course, 
they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted7 or they fell within a recognized hearsay 
exception). 8 
b. Response in Nance 
In Nance v. State,9 trial Judge David B. Mitchell 
took a bold step. In their trial testimony, three principal 
State's witnesseslo denied all relevant knowledge of the 
crime - a drug turf related murder. This testimony was at 
complete odds with their grand jury testimony and the 
pretrial signed, written statements that they had made to 
the police. One of the witnesses also had given a signed 
statement to police and to an assistant State's attorney 
that he had been contacted by a friend of one of the 
defendants and taken to the office of that defendant's 
lawyer, to whom he said that he wouldnot testify against 
the defendants. I I Another gave a signed written statement 
ofwamings he had received from that defendant and 
another. 12 When questioned at trial, the witnesses 
"remembered some parts of these earlier events, did not 
remember others, and outright denied or repudiated other 
parts. Their lapses of memory conspicuously occurred 
7See LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL §§ 801.5-
.11 (\ 987 & Supp. \995). 
RSee id. Parts 801(4), 801(5), and 803-804(5). 
9331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993). 
If'They were recalled as court's witnesses after they had recanted at trial. 
This step would no longer be necessary today, because of the adoption 
of Md. Rule 5-607. 
11331 Md. at 555,629 A.2d at 636. 
Rules Committee (May 31, 1991)( on file with author). l2See id. at 556, 629 A.2d at 636. 
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whenever the questions at trial approached matters 
potentially implicating Nance and [a co-defendant] in the 
murder."13 Absent the substantive use of the witnesses' 
prior statements, a judgment for acquittal would have had 
to be granted, as there was no other evidence identifying 
the defendants as the guilty parties. 
Breaking with traditional Maryland case law, Judge 
Mitchell found the prior statements reliable and admitted 
them as substantive evidence. In 1993, the court of 
appeals, in a scholarly opinion by Judge McAuliffe for a 
unanimous court, affinned that both of the witnesses' prior 
inconsistent statements, (1) their grand jury testimony, and 
(2) written statements, based on the witnesses' fIrst-hand 
knowledge, which were signed or otherwise adopted by 
them, had been properly permitted to be admitted as 
substantive evidence, since the witnesses were present at 
trial and thus subject to cross-examination. 14 
Judge McAuliffe quoted Judge Learned Hand's 
comments that, when a witness denies earlier statements, 
it "may be highly probative to observe the mark and 
manner of his denial. ... "15 The jury will evaluate the 
evidence, "from what they see and hear of that person in 
COurt."16 
c. Codification of Nance 
In 1994, Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (a) codifIed and 
expanded the court of appeals's decision in Nance. Under 
the Rule, the following types of prior inconsistent statements 
of a declarant who testifIes at trial and is subject to cross-
131d. at 556-58, 572, 629 A.2d at 636-37,644-45. 
14See id. at 331 Md. 549, 569, 629 A.2d at 643 (1993). Accord Stewart 
v. State, 104 Md. App. 273, 655 A.2d 1345 (1995) (trial court properly 
admitted "turncoat witness's" signed statement and grand jUl)' testimony; 
state need not show surprise; Sheppard v. State, 102 Md. App. 571, 
650 A.2d 1362 (1994) (reversible error to admit State's witnesses prior 
inconsistent signed written statements, made to public defender's 
investigator, as impeachment evidence only, when defense offered them 
as substantive evidence). But cf Bradley v. State, 333 Md. 593, 607, 636 
A.2d 999, 1006 (1994) (Nance inapplicable when witness had not signed 
statement to police; detective only made notes of interview). 
15331 Md. at 566, 629 A.2d at 641. 
161d. 
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examinationl ? concerning the prior statement are admissible 
as substantive evidence: 
(1) statements put in writing (not necessarily by the 
declarant) and then signed (or otherwise adopted) by the 
declarant; I g 
(2) statements made under oath in a formal 
proceeding, such as a grand jury proceeding, deposition, 
or trial; 19 and 
(3) statements stenographically or electronically 
recorded.20 
17The stem of Mo.RuLE 5-802.1 provides: 
The following statements previously made by a witness who testifies at 
the trial or hearing and who is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement are not excluded by the hearsay rule .... 
18See e.g., Pefl)' v. State, 344 Md. 204, 242-43, 686 A.2d 274, 293 
(1996); Stewart v. State, 342 Md. 230,674 A.2d 944 (1996) (signed 
statement on the back of a photo array card); Parker v. State, 129 Md. 
App. 360,400-01,742 A.2d 28,50 (1997); Thomas v. State, 113 Md. 
App. 1,4-5,686 A.2d 676 (1996) (signed, written statement properly 
admitted); Makell v. State, 104 Md. App. 334, 656 A.2d 348 (1995). 
MD. RULE 5-802.1 (a)(2) permits the substantive use of: "[a] 
statement that is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, if the 
statement was ... (2) reduced to writing and signed by the declarant .. 
. ," when the requirements of the stem of MD. RULE 5-802.1 are met. 
Subsection (a)(2)' s restriction to only signed statements was a deliberate 
rejection of the Hawaii rule's extension to written statements that are 
"signed or otherwise adopted or approved." Stewart v. State, 342 Md. 
230,237 n.2, 674 A.2d 944,948 n.2 (1996). But even a signed statement 
"might not be admissible if the circumstances suggest that the declarant 
did not clearly intend to adopt it by signing." ld. at 238 n.3, 674 A.2d at 
948 n.3. 
19See e.g., Stewart v. State, 342 Md. 230, 674 A.2d 944 (1996) (grand 
jUl)' testimony); Makell y. State, 104 Md. App. 334, 656 A.2d 348 
(1995). Md. Rule 5-802.I(a)(I) permits the substantive use of: "[a] 
statement that is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, if the 
statement was (I) given under oath subject to the penalty ofperjul)' at 
a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition ... ," when the 
requirements of the stem of MD. RULE 5-802.1 are met. 
2°Md. Rule 5-802. I (a)(3) provides: "[a] statement that is inconsistent 
with the declarant's testimony, if the statement was ... (3) recorded in 
substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic means 
contemporaneously with the making of the statement .... " See 
Dumornay v. State, 106 Md. App. 361, 664 A.2d 469 (1995) (no error 
in admitting, under Nance, prior inconsistent statements that were tape-
recorded). 
In adopting subsection (a)(3), the court of appeals used 
"stenographic" to mean contemporaneously preserved by a reliable 
stenographer, not, e.g., any police officer's "shorthand." Notes of 
November 18, 1993, open hearing, on file with author. 
Under the pre-Maryland Rule 5-607 common law 
voucher rule, the party calling the witness could not impeach 
the witness by prior inconsistent statement, unless both 
surprised and affirmatively damaged by the witness's 
testimony. No such surprise need be shown in order to 
introduce a statement under Rule 5-802.1 (a), because it 
is offered not to impeach, but as reliable, substantive 
evidence.21 
d. Erosion of the Nance Policy in Tyler 
In Tyler v. State,22 the evidence established that either 
Tyler or the declarant, who were seated together in a car, 
Some other states' codifications, like Maryland's, have dropped 
the requirement that the prior inconsistent statement be under oath. 
ARIZ.R.EvID. 801(d)(I)(A); DEL.UNIF.R.EvID. 801(d)(I)(A); 
MONT.R.EvID. 801 (d)( I)(A). HAWAII R.EvID. 802.1 (I) provides for the 
admission of prior inconsistent statements which either were made under 
oath in a proceeding or in a deposition; or were "[r]educed to writing and 
signed or otherwise adopted or approved by the declarant;" or were 
"[r]ecorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic, mechanical, 
electrical, or other means .... " PUERTO RICO R.EvID. 63 classifies all 
prior statements of a witness, both consistent and inconsistent, as falling 
within a hearsay exception. See also Graham, Proposed Amendments to 
Rules BOI(d)(l)(A) and 613(b), in ABA, Litigation Section, Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence 53-66 (1985) (Graham 
proposes broadening FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1 )(A) to be more similar to 
the Hawaii rule and to read as follows: "A statement is not hearsay if 
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and [t]he statement is 
inconsistent with his testimony, and (i) is proved to have been made 
under oath subject to penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other 
proceeding or in a deposition, or (ii) is made by a declarant having 
personal knowledge ofthe underlying event or condition the statement 
narrates, describes, or explains and (l) the statement is proved to have 
been written or signed by the declarant, or (2) the making ofthe statement 
is acknowledged to have been made either (a) by the declarant in his 
testimony in the present proceeding or (b) by the declarant under oath 
subject to the penalty of perjury at a prior trial, hearing or other proceeding 
or in a deposition, or (3) the statement is proved to have been accurately 
recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recorder, or any other similar 
electronic means of sound recording .... "); Note, Substantive Admissibility 
of a Non-Party Witness' Prior Inconsistent Statements: Pennsylvania 
Adopts the Modern View, 32 VILL. L. REv. 471 (1987). 
21 Stewart v. State, 342 Md. 230,674 A.2d 944 (1996). 
22342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127 (1996), rev'g 105 Md. App. 495, 660 
A.2d 986 ( 1995) (en banc). 
The prior testimony did not fall under the hearsay exception for 
prior testimony, now codified at MD. RULE 5-804(b)(l), because, even 
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had shot the victim (Len Bias's brother, Jay). Thedeclarant 
had given sworn testimony, at his own trial for the murder, 
that his cohort, Tyler, had killed the victim. But when asked 
about the shooting at Tyler's subsequent trial, the declarant 
repeatedly stated only "I can't answer that question," 
despite the court's order to answer.23 The witness's 
attorney had informed the court that someone in a brown 
car had followed the witness and struck his car the night 
before he was to appear at Tyler's trial and that the witness 
felt he was "in great danger ifhe testifie[ d] in this case."24 
The court of appeals, in an opinion authored by Judge 
Chasanow, became stymied by the analytical problem of 
whether the assertion, "I can't answer that question," was 
inconsistent with the earlier testimony. The witness did 
not say, for example, "I fired the shots," or "I never saw 
anything," both of which clearly would have been 
inconsistent with his earlier testimony . What he said was, 
in this author's opinion, and in accordance with the thrust 
of now Chief Judge, then Judge Joseph Murphy's 
concurrence in the Court of Special Appeals' decision 
affinning Tyler's conviction,25 more akin to saying, "I have 
no memory now." Several federal courts have treated a 
witness's testimony to lack of present memory as 
"inconsistent" with prior statements in which the witness 
had purported to have memory.26 
The court of appeals held that the witness simply 
had refused to testify at Tyler's trial, and therefore not 
only had not "testified" inconsistently with his prior 
testimony at his own trial, but was not "subj ect to cross-
examination" concerning that prior testimony. 27 
though the declarant's refusal to testify made him "unavailable" for 
purposes of Rule 5-804(a), Tyler had had no opportunity to cross-
examine at the declarant's trial. See MARYLAND EVIDENCE, supra note 7, 
§ 804(1).1. 
2JSee 342 Md. at 771-72,679 A.2d at 1130. 
24 105 Md. App. at 508,660 A.2d at 992-93. 
2lTyler v. State, 105 Md. App. 495,565,660 A.2d 986, 1020 (en banc) 
(Murphy, J., concurring), reversed, 342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127 (1996). 
See Comment, The Forgetful Witness, 60 U. CHI. L.REv. 167 (1993). 
26See infra note 46. 
27342 Md. at 776-79, 679 A.2d at 1132-33. 
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 7 
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Unfortunately, that conclusion permits the easy 
circumvention - by a witness's repeating the mantra "I 
can't answer that question" (instead of, as in Nance, "I 
don't remember") - of the policy behind Nance and 
Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (a): the unwillingness to let a 
recalcitrant or threatened witness's failure to testify at trial 
thwart justice. In an attempt to curtail the undesirable 
effects of the court of appeals's decision in Tyler - with 
1x>th possibly guilty parties not being convicted, even though 
the facts were clear that one of them was the shooter-
the court, therefore, took pains to caution strongly against 
severance of the trials of co-perpetrators. 28 
e. Corbett and the Further Multiplication of 
Divergent Paths 
In Corbett v. State,29 the Court of Special Appeals 
further contributed to the undennining of the policy behind 
Nance and Maryland Rule 5-802.1 (a), as well as Maryland 
Rule 5-104(a). The Corbett trial court had admitted, 
under Rule 5-802.1 (a), a twelve-year-old alleged sexual 
abuse victim's written and signed statement, made to the 
police, when at trial she testified to some of the surrounding 
events and to her making the statement, but stated that at 
trial she "could not remember" the abusive incident itself. 
A panel of the court of special appeals, in a well-researched 
opinion by Judge Byrnes, found this to be reversible error. 
The appellate court held that the prior statement would 
be "inconsistent" with the witness's trial testimony only if 
the trial court had found, under Rule 5-1 04(a), that the 
witness did remember, but was being evasive. The court 
of special appeals held, on the other hand, that the prior 
statement could not come in under Rule 5-802.1 (a) if the 
trial judge believed that the witness really could not 
remember. The appellate court held that the trial court 
had erroneously admitted the prior statement, absent an 
explicit fmding on this question, under Rule 5-1 04(a). 
28See id. at 769-70 n.2, 679 A.2d at 1129 n.2. See, e.g., Conyersv. State, 
345 Md. 525, 546-56, 693 A.2d 781, 791-96 (1997) (no abuse of 
discretion in denial of motion to sever). 
29No. 755 (Md. App. Mar. 1,2000) (at the time of this writing, the time 
for filing a petition for certiorari has not expired). 
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 8 
Interestingly, the Corbett decision is contrary to the 
opinion of another panel of the court of special appeals in 
Makell v. State,30 where, in a thorough and thoughtful 
opinion authored by Judge Moylan, the court of special 
appeals held that total loss of memory does not make the 
statement inadmissible, nor does it make the witness 
unavailable for cross-examination. 
The distinction between feigned and real memory loss 
is not without support, however, in some ofthe lower 
federal courts' case law, which is widely divergent on this 
controversial issue.31 But it seems to make no practical 
difference to the character or quantum o/the witness's 
trial testimony, whether the witness now is lying when 
she says she cannot remember (only then is the prior 
statement admissible under Corbett), the witness is telling 
the truth when she says she cannot remember (then the 
prior statement is inadmissible under Corbett), the witness 
testifies that she "can't answer that question" (then the 
prior statement is inadmissible under Tyler), or the witness 
testifies "I didn't see anything" (then the prior statement is 
admissible under Nance). 
These are differences without distinction to the fact-
finder. In each of these situations, the witness's trial 
statements are inconsistent with his or her prior statements 
in which, as ChiefJudge Murphy has explained, the witness 
implicitly said "I can answer,"32 or "I do remember." 
f. The Confrontation Clause: The Heart of the 
Matter 
The gravamen of the question seems more to be 
whether the witness is "subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement," as required by Rule 5-802.1 (a). 
The witness is at trial and the fact-finder can see the 
witness's demeanor. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, in affinning a conviction based in part on the grand 
jury testimony of a witness who, at trial, denied knowledge 
311104 Md. App. 334,656 A.2d 348 (1995). 
31See infra notes 36-40 and 46 and accompanying text. 
32Tyler v. State, 105 Md. App. 495, 565, 660 A.2d 986, 1030 (Murphy, 
J., concurring), rev'd, 342 Md. 766, 679 A.2d 1127 (1996). 
of the relevant facts, has pointed out th~ value to the fact-
finder of seeing the witness at trial, and seeing the witness 
cross-examined, even ifhe did not testify to any relevant 
fact: 
In this case, of course, Robinson [the 
witness] did appear on the witness stand. 
Indeed, the defendants complain that this 
prejudiced their cases in the minds of 
the jurors, but the judge ordered the initial 
examination of Robinson in the presence 
of the jury in order that the jury would 
not be left with speculation about the 
reason for Robinson's absence, 
speculation which might have suggested 
inferences more hurtful to the defendants 
than Robinson's refusal to testify. He 
was presented for cross-examination 
only after Robinson had stated in an in 
camera hearing that he might answer the 
questions of defense counsel, and that 
he could not tell whether he would 
respond until they asked the questions. 
Though, as we have indicated earlier, 
the jurors may have taken Robinson's 
earlier disclaimers of knowledge as 
equivalent to a later explicit refusal 
to testify, they also may have received 
such disclaimers, with Robinson's 
statement that his grand jury 
testimony was inaccurate, as 
exculpatory. In any event, the jury 
saw and heard Robinson on the 
witness stand. What they saw and 
heard may have been of substantial 
assistance to the jury in assessing the 
truthfulness of his grand jury 
testimony.33 
In finding the admission of evidence constitutional, 
the Fourth Circuit relied on the fact that corroborating 
33United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1146 (4th Cir. 1978). 
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evidence proved the reliability of Robinson' s prior grand 
jury testimony.34 That avenue subsequently has been 
foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Idaho v. Wright,35 which held that the presence or 
absence of corroborating evidence is irrelevant to whether 
an out-of-court statement is sufficiently reliable to survive 
a confrontation clause challenge, and is relevant only to 
whether an error in admission was harmless or reversible. 
But, in 1988, the United States Supreme Court, in 
United States v. Owens,36 held that a witness who 
presently had no memory of the subject matter of the prior 
statement is nonetheless "subject to cross" at the trial. The 
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, rejected 
the argument that the confrontation clause required a 
distinction between a witness who feigned memory loss 
and a witness who really had memory loss.37 After all, 
"the witness' assertion of memory loss - which ... is 
often the very result sought to be produced by cross-
examination, ... can be effective in destroying the force 
of the prior statement."38 
34See id. ("We do not hold, however, that this cross-examination under 
these difficult circumstances was adequate to meet the requirements of 
the Confrontation Clause. It is enough that the grand jury testimony 
was admissible because of its strong corroboration by the testimony of 
Miss McKee and the undeniable records.") (citations omitted). 
31497 U.S. 805 (1990). See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547,636 
A.2d 463 (1994) (reversible error to admit declaration against penal 
interest - signed confession made during police interrogation - of 
defendant's cohort, who refused to testify; although "necessity" 
requirement of Ohio v. Roberts was met, State failed to meet its burden 
of showing particularized guarantees of trustworthiness ofthe statement, 
which did not fall within a "firmly rooted" exception; declarant had 
admitted to playing only a minor role in the offense and shifted major 
blame to others; Idaho v. Wright forbade consideration of corroborating 
evidence on question of trustworthiness, although corroborating evidence 
may be considered as to whether error was harmless). 
36484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
37See id. See, e.g., United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314 (7th Cir. 
1985); Van Hatten v. State, 666 P.2d 1047 (Alaska App. 1983)(feigning 
witness is still "subject to cross-examination"). 
33Id. at 562. Accord Makel\ v. State, 104 Md. App. 334, 656 A.2d 348 
(1995) (even if the witness has total memory loss, the witness is still 
"subject to cross-examination"). But see Corbett v. State, No. 755 (Md. 
App. Mar. I , 2000), supra at note 29 and accompanying text. 
The making of a statement qualifying under Md. Rule 5-802.I(a) 
need not be proved by the declarant's trial testimony. See Makell v. 
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 9 
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The Owens majority held that an assault victim's prior 
identification of the defendant as his attacker was 
admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(l )(C), 
as he was "subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement,"39 when he testified at trial that he remembered 
making the statement to an FBI agent but had no present 
recollection of the identity of his attacker and was unable 
to explain the basis for the identification. The victim's 
memory loss was a result of severe head injuries caused 
by the beating at issue. The Court also held that the 
confrontation clause was not violated. The opportunity to 
cross-examine suffices.40 (A different situation arises if 
the witness is called to the stand at the trial but refuses to 
testify by invoking a privilege. )41 
Indeed, in apparent recognition of Owens, the court 
of special appeals in Corbett states that "the parties do 
not dispute that [the witness] was present at trial and 
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. "42 
Yet the Corbett court requires the result as to admissibility 
to turn on the very distinction that Owens had rejected. 
Moreover, despite the fact that the record provided 
sufficient indicia to support a reasonable inference that the 
child was feigning memory loss because she was reluctant 
to testify, the appellate court reversed and remanded, 
because the trial judge had not made such a finding on the 
State, 104 Md. App. 334, 656 A.2d 348 (1995). See also McCray v. 
State, 122 Md. App. 598, 613, 716 A.2d 302, 309 (1998). 
39484 U.S. at 561. 
411See id at 557-61 (noting, inter alia, that the advisory committee note to 
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3), which defines a witness testifying to a loss of 
memory as unavailable, states that FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3) "clearly 
contemplates his production and subjection to cross-examination"). 
4lSee United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. at 561-62; United States v. 
Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 1999) (confrontation right 
precludes admission of prior grand jury testimony under FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(\)(A), even when witness repeatedly invokes an unavailable 
privilege); WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 80 I. \0 [2][a] & [b][iii] at 
801-17-19 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed.) (2d ed. 1999) (prior inconsistent 
statement cannot be used if a privilege is successfully invoked but may 
be used if witness lacks memory). Cf Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 
(\ 965) (when declarant of out-of-court confession invoked self-
incrimination privilege and was thus unavailable for cross-examination, 
defendant's right to confront was violated by admission of confession). 
42Corbett v. State, No. 755, slip op. at I3(Md. App. Mar. 1,2000). 
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 10 
record. Maryland Rule 5-1 04( a) does not, on its face, 
require that trial judges make every preliminary factual 
finding on the record. To impose such a requirement would 
be needlessly to build in a torrent of reversible error, even 
when the record suffices to support an implicit finding by 
the trial court. 
g. Comparison of Corbett with the Lower Federal 
Courts' Approach 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(l)(A),43 although 
narrower than Maryland Rule 5-802. 1 (a) in scope (in 
federal court, the prior inconsistent statement must have 
been under oath, in a formal proceeding),44 has the same 
threshold requirements: that the declarant testify at trial 
43FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(A) provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay 
if - The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is inconsistent 
with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the 
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition 
.... " See generally 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 251 at 117-21 (John W. 
Strong, ed.) (5th ed. 1999); Blakey, Substantive Use o/Prior Inconsistent 
Statements Under the Federal Rules o/Evidence, 64 Ky. L.J. 3 (1974); 
Graham, Examination o/One 's Own Witness Under the Federal Rules 0/ 
Evidence, 54 TEX. L. REv. 917, 966-72 (1976); Silbert, Federal Rule 0/ 
Evidence 801 (d)(\ )(A), 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 880 (\ 976); Stuesser, Admitting 
Prior Inconsistent Statements/or Their Truth, 71 CANADIAN B.REv. 18 
(1992) (recommending that Canadian law be changed to give trial judge 
discretion to admit seemingly reliable, necessary statements as 
substantive evidence); Comment, Extrinsic Evidence o/Prior Inconsistent 
Statements: Pennsylvania and the Judicial Discretion Foundational Rule, 
79 DICK. L. REv. 444 (1975); Comment, Impeachment by Inconsistent 
Statements: California Theory and Practice, 9 U.C.D. L. REv. 285, 308-
09 (1976); 39 MD. L. REv. 472 (1975). 
"See United States v. Livingston, 661 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir.1981) (reversible 
error to admit as substantive evidence sworn statement given to postal 
inspectors); United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 
1977) (unsworn statement made to FBI agent); Martin v. United States, 
528 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir.1975) (sworn and unsworn statements 
before two investigating officers). But see United States v. Castro-
Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.) (tape recorded immigration interrogation 
before federal agent qualifies as "proceeding" under Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(I)(A», cert. denied, 429 U.S. 983, 97 S.Ct. 501, 50 L.Ed.2d 594 
(1976); State v. Smith, 97 Wash.2d 856, 651 P.2d 207 (\982)(affidavit 
in witness-victim's own words, made at station house and attested to 
before a notary, qualified). See WEINSTEIN, supra note 41, § 801.1 0[2][ d] 
at 801-19-21 (federal rule should be interpreted to require "some kind of 
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding"). 
and be subject to cross-examination concerning the prior 
statement. 45 
United States v. Owens dispensed with the need to 
distinguish between feigned and real memory loss for 
confrontation clause purposes. Under the lower federal 
courts' rulings, the trial court, in its discretion, may 
determine that a particular witness's claimed lack of 
memory is sufficiently inconsistent with a prior statement 
to permit admission.46 
h. Other Alternatives Pursued in the Federal System 
But it is important to recognize that, in the federal 
system, the problem of the recanting witness has been 
addressed in two additional ways. First, several courts, 
including the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, have applied Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)( 5) 
[now Federal Rule of Evidence 807], the hearsay residual 
4SFED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(A), (B) and (C). 
46See, e.g., United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1364 (10th Cir. 1997); 
United States V. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 46-47 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (grand jury 
testimony of witness who at trial testified to lack of memory was admitted 
properly under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(A) as a prior inconsistent 
statement), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 919, rehearing denied, 513 U.S. 1067 
(1994); United States V. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 958 (6th Cir.1981) (no 
abuse of discretion to admit witnesses' grand jury testimony as 
substantive evidence, when witnesses had only partial or vague 
recollection; no error to admit parts that corroborated in-court testimony, 
when "the prior statements are predominantly inconsistent with the in-
court statements, and the corroborative portions are needed to set the 
whole in context;" in addition, much of grand jury testimony was 
admissible under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1 )(C), which has no inconsistency 
requirement), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); United States V. 
Marchand, 564 F.2d 983,998-99 (2d Cir. 1977) (witness forgetting or 
denying facts to which he or she testified before grand jury will be 
sufficient inconsistency), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978). But see 
United States V. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325, 1344-45 (5th Cir.1991) (on 
facts of the case, witness's claim offaulty memory did not amount to 
denial of earlier statement or to inconsistent statement), reh 'g denied, 
943 F.2d 1315 (5th ed. 1991); United Statesv. Palumbo, 639F.2d 123, 
128 n.6 (3d Cir.1981) (because witness's assertion at trial that she could 
not remember where she obtained the cocaine "was not necessarily 
inconsistent with her prior statement" before grand jury that she had 
obtained it from defendant, prior testimony was inadmissible) (emphasis 
inoriginal),cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819(1981). 
Articles 
exception, to admit reliable prior grand jury testimony of 
the now uncooperative or unavailable witness.47 
Maryland's inhospitable decision in State V. 
Walker,48 however, seems to make it unlikely that the Court 
of Appeals ofMaryland would permit such evidence under 
. Mary land's corollary rule, Rule 5-804(b)( 5). 
Second, under the new provision found in Federal 
Rule of Evidence 804(b )(5), an accused waives his or her 
confrontation right by procuring the absence or silence of 
a witness.49 The Rules Committee should evaluate whether 
to propose the adoption of a similar rule in Mary land. 
i. Conclusion 
Maryland's courts must not lose sight of the policy 
determinations faced squarely in Nance. Shoring up the 
Nance doctrine, by rejecting the distinction drawn by the 
court of special appeals in Corbett and retreating from 
47See e.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982) (at 
first trial, witness testified he did not remember; at second, the witness 
refused to be sworn). 
4R345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1997). 
49FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) provides: "(b) Hearsay exceptions. The 
following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: ... (5) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement 
offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that 
was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability ofthe declarant as a 
witness." Cf United States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1971)(a 
pre-Federal Rules of Evidence case, finding reversible error in admission 
of recalcitrant witness's grand jury testimony; although witness took 
the stand at trial, he refused to be sworn, but did make answers such as 
'''I don't recall"'). 
In Fiore, the court of appeals suggested that, on re-trial: 
[\]t is not beyond possibility that the Government may 
be able to establish that [the witness's] recalcitrance was 
due to "the suggestion, procurement or act of the 
accused," see Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 
471-472,20 S. Ct. 993, 998,44 L. Ed. 1150 (1900) in 
which event, as recognized in Douglas v. Alabama, supra, 
380 U.S. at 420, 85 S. Ct. 1074, a different rule would 
apply. If ever there was a case where resort to the 
principle of Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552,560, 
70 S. Ct. 317, 94 L. Ed. 335 (1950), is appropriate, this 
is it. 
443 F.2d at 116. 
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the position taken in Tyler, is imperative. So, too, is an 
open mind to the appropriate use of Maryland Rule 5-
804(b)( 5)' s residual hearsay exception and the possible 
adoption ofa rule like new Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(b)(5) regarding wrongdoing that procures the 
unavailability of a witness. The problem of the recanting, 
intimidated witness will not go away; it threatens 
Maryland's criminaljustice system and must be forcefully 
addressed. 
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